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1. Introduction
Pursuant to Criminal Procedural Code,1 assets from criminal activities are
subject to evidence to the extent of their income, range, content, and height.
From the perspective of the investigative process performed by the judicial and
police authorities, the gathering of illegal assets as evidence deriving from
criminal activities is required, and treated as any other subject of evidence as it
relates to mens rea or actus reus.
 e primary reason why it is necessary to investigate illegal assets from
criminal activities is to create a su cient procedural base for judicial
impositions of the sanctions related to the con scation of income from
criminal activities.
Section 58(2) of the Criminal Code2 stipulates the  rst category of crimes
punishable by the con scation of property, while taking into account the
circumstances under which the criminal o ence was committed, and the
personal situation of the o ender.  e court may order the forfeiture of
property of the o ender whom it sentences to life imprisonment or to
unconditional imprisonment for a particularly serious felony, through which
the o ender gained or tried to gain large-scale property bene ts or caused
large-scale damage.  e large scale bene t or damage is de ned pursuant the
Section 125(1) of the Criminal Code as a sum at least equal to 133,000€.
 e second category when the court orders the forfeiture of property, even
in the absence of the conditions referred above when sentencing perpetrators of
criminal o ences for so-called predicative o ences,3 is if the o ender has
acquired a substantial extent of property, or part thereof from the proceeds of
crime. Substantial extent or damage is de ned pursuant to Section 125(1) of
the Criminal Code as a sum at least equal to 26,600€.
 e third category when the court mandates the forfeiture of property, even
in the absence of the conditions referred above, when sentencing perpetrators
for the criminal o ence of the legalization of proceeds of crime pursuant to
Section 233 of the Criminal Code when his or her property or part thereof was
acquired from the proceeds of crime, at least in the substantial extent pursuant
to Section 233(2), or acquired his or her property or part thereof from the
proceeds of crime to at least a large scale extent.4
2. Current status
Despite the legal obligation of the police and judicial authorities to gather
evidence regarding illegal income from criminal activities and the mandatory
obligation to impose the punishment of the forfeiture of property, statistics
show con icting data. Since 2011 there have been raised indictments in 111
cases, but no punishments have been imposed for the forfeiture of property,
although individuals have been found guilty for the legalization of proceeds of
crime pursuant to Section 233 of the Criminal Code.
While analyzing these cases, it is evident that the judicial ruling on the legal
criteria for imposing the punishment of the forfeiture of property has not been
met in these particular cases.  e ruling may have been interpreted in a way
that the judicial  le has not included any or su cient evidence to rule the
forfeiture of the property.  ere should be a direct nexus proven between
proceeds or assets and the particular criminal activity. Intent of the perpetrator
to gather the proceeds or assets is insu cient for imposing the forfeiture of
property.5  e process of gathering the evidence of the proceeds of crimes is
subjected to  nancial investigation.
Financial investigation is a proceeding of the police and judicial authorities
that is independent from the investigation and the prosecution for the
predicative crime. Financial investigation is a secondary and supplementary
evidence gathering process focused on the trace and undercover of the proceeds
from the criminal activities in order to establish reasonable ground to impose
the punishment of the forfeiture of property by the judicial authority, or to
decide to freeze assets in the pre- trial or trial phase to ensure the proper
execution of further judicial decision if the legitimate criteria are met.
Currently, the  nancial investigation has not been established by the
Criminal Procedural Code, nor by any other relevant legal source, at least in a
formal way. Additionally,  nancial investigations have not been incorporated
into the organizational structures of police forces nor the prosecutor’s o ces. It
is important to note that the police or judicial authority performing an
investigation are currently completely allocated for the investigation of the
predicative crimes, and they time time and/or personal capacity to perform a
 nancial investigation.
Table n. 1. Seizure of assets in Slovakia done by the Financial Intelligence
Unit of the National Criminal Agency6
Y2011
Seizure of money acc. S. 95 of the Criminal Procedural Code 40
Seizure of security papers acc. S. 96 of the Slovak Criminal Code 1
Surrender of items acc. S. 550 of the Criminal Procedural Code (evidence in the judicial
cooperation in the criminal matters)
7
Seizure of property acc S. 551 of the Criminal Procedural Code (the execution of the foreign asset
related judicial decision in the judicial cooperation in the criminal matters)
2
Table n. 2. Criminal o ence of money laundering acc. Section 233 of the
Criminal Code







Table n. 3. Seizure of assets in Slovakia done by the Financial Intelligence
Unit of the National Criminal Agency 8
Y2012
Criminal o ence of money
laundering acc. S. 233 and S.




Seizure of money acc. S. 95 of the Criminal Procedural Code 40 45
Seizure of security papers acc. S. 96 of the Slovak Criminal
Code
1 5
Surrender of items acc. S. 550 of the Criminal Procedural
Code (evidence in the judicial cooperation in the criminal
matters)
7 0
Seizure of property acc. S. 551 of the Criminal Procedural
Code (the execution of the foreign asset related judicial
decision in the judicial cooperation in the criminal matters)
2 0
Table n. 4. Criminal o ence of money laundering acc. Section 233 of the







Table n. 5. Seizure of assets in Slovakia done by the Financial Intelligence
Unit of the National Criminal Agency10
Y2013
Criminal o ence of money
laundering acc. S. 233 and S.




Seizure of money acc. S. 95 of the Criminal Procedural Code 12 0
Seizure of security papers acc. S. 96 of the Slovak Criminal 0 1
Code
Surrender of items acc. S. 550 of the Criminal Procedural
Code (evidence in the judicial cooperation in the criminal
matters)
0 42
Seizure of property acc. S. 551 of the Criminal Procedural
Code (the execution of the foreign asset related judicial
decision in the judicial cooperation in the criminal matters)
0 48
Table n. 6. Criminal o ence of money laundering acc. Section 233 of the







Table n. 7. Criminal o ence of money laundering acc. Section 233 of the







Table n. 8. Seizure of assets in Slovakia done by the Financial Intelligence
Unit of the National Criminal Agency13
Y2014
Criminal o ence of money
laundering acc. S. 233 and S.




Seizure of money acc. S. 95 of the Criminal Procedural Code 22 198
Seizure of security papers acc. S. 96 of the Slovak Criminal
Code
0 1
Surrender of items acc. S. 550 of the Criminal Procedural
Code (evidence in the judicial cooperation in the criminal
matters)
2 37
Seizure of property acc. S. 551 of the Criminal Procedural
Code (the execution of the foreign asset related judicial
decision in the judicial cooperation in the criminal matters)
7 24
Table n. 9. Criminal o ence of money laundering acc. Section 233 of the






Con scation of the property-0
Table n. 10. Criminal o ence of money laundering acc. Section 233 of the







We have provided the statistics regarding the legalization of proceeds of
crime pursuant to Section 233 of the Criminal Code.  e statement given
above is in regards to the e ectiveness of prosecution and the sanctioning of
economic crimes as such.
A comprehensive  nancial investigation is considered one of the most
e ective tools to  ght against organized crime. Seizing and sourcing out the
income of organized crime works preventively, as it is able to stop generating
additional income by these groups. In this way it narrows the possibilities for
serious criminal activities.16
3. The necessity of effective financial
investigation
Veri cation and tracing of  nancial transactions, digital data in account or
CRM17 systems, or other databases may identify any illegal income,
payments, secret accounts, non-justi able items and entries in ledgers, and/or
illegitimate depreciations. Financial investigations have led to the discovery of
hidden SPVs,18 acting in accordance with business relations or transaction
schemes including information on real bene ciary owners.
 e urgent need to identify any person who exercises ownership or control
over a legal entity in order to ensure e ective transparency has been articulated
in the basic anti-money laundering legal source within the EU: the recently
adopted IV. Directive. ‘Identi cation and veri cation of bene cial owners
should, where relevant, extend to legal entities that own other legal entities,
and obliged entities should look for the natural person(s) who ultimately
exercises control through ownership or through other means of the legal entity
that is the customer. Control through other means may, inter alia, include the
criteria of control used for the purpose of preparing consolidated  nancial
statements, such as through a shareholders’ agreement, the exercise of
dominant in uence or the power to appoint senior management.  ere may be
cases where no natural person is identi able who ultimately owns or exerts
control over a legal entity. In such exceptional cases, obliged entities, having
exhausted all other means of identi cation, and provided there are no grounds
for suspicion, may consider the senior managing o cial(s) to be the bene cial
owner(s).’19 ‘ e need for accurate and up-to-date information on the
bene cial owner is a key factor in tracing criminals who might otherwise hide
their identity behind a corporate structure. Member States should therefore
ensure that entities incorporated within their territory in accordance with
national law obtain and hold adequate, accurate and current information on
their bene cial ownership, in addition to basic information such as the
company name and address and proof of incorporation and legal
ownership.’20 Member States should ensure that the widest possible range of
legal entities incorporated or created by any other mechanism in their territory
is covered. While  nding a speci ed percentage shareholding or ownership
interest does not automatically result in  nding the bene cial owner, it should
be one evidential factor among others to be taken into account. Member States
should be able, however, to decide that a lower percentage may be an
indication of ownership or control.21
Linking true bene ciary owners and their assets with the committed crimes
are key factors of a successful  nancial investigation. Tracing these links is
usually known as a creation of an economic pro le or asset pro le of the
accused. Economic pro ling is a part of a  nancial investigation, and is usually
based upon open source checks.  e gathered evidence should not be used
only for investigation and prosecution of money laundering, but as important
evidence in the prosecution for the predicative crime (e.g. to provide a more
complete picture of the structure of an organized group).
Another reason to support e ective  nancial investigations in the Slovak
Republic are detailed in the following recommendations of Money Val experts,
which stipulate that: – the Slovak authorities could give more speci c training
on money laundering and terrorist  nancing o ences, and the seizure, freezing,
and con scation of property that is the proceeds of crime, or is to be used to
 nance terrorism, to police, prosecutors, and judges;22 and – an increase in
dedicated resources and sta  to the FIU for its activities in the supervision
 eld, and for its performance of a more e ective national coordination role.23
 e experts also emphasized that:
– more training on terrorist  nancing-related issues, including those
regarding the implementation of SR III requirements, should be provided to
the National Bank of Slovakia’s supervisory sta  involved in Anti-Money
Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) initiative;24
– authorities should provide the FIU with additional resources to allow
more detailed coordination on the national level;25
– there are some de cits on the e ectiveness of money laundering and
terrorist  nancing investigations;26
– there is currently a lack of su cient coordination between major players of
the AML/CFT regime;27
– more e ective mechanisms are needed to coordinate at the operational
level;28 and – there is no evidence of concrete arrangements for coordination
of seizure and con scation actions with other countries, or for sharing
con scated assets with them, other than those provided under the Framework
Decision applicable for EU Member States.29
4. Conclusion
Legal development in the Slovak Republic has grown signi cantly in recent
years while continuously evolving and adopting new tools to make the  ght
against economic crime more e ective. A new Whistleblowing Act,30 allows
Parliament to address the act of criminal responsibility of legal persons. It is
possible that all these legislative activities may become obsolete, and the Slovak
Republic will ful ll the expected criteria only in a formal way.  e current
system of investigation and prosecution does not rely on the  nancial
investigation, and the sta  will not be able to put these (both recently adopted
and still developing) legal tools into practice.  e justi cation for the failure to
do so will likely be that the ‘practitioners have not got used to’ the process, as
evidenced in the statistics. Another such tool is the called in-direct criminal
responsibility of legal persons, established through the sanction-protective
measure of the forfeiture of money sum or forfeiture of property. It was been
established in 2011, and since then, no claim against a legal person has been
raised, and no legal person has been brought before the court.
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